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Abstract
Background: In 2003, Médecins Sans Frontières, the provincial government, and the provincial
health authority began a community project to guarantee financial access to primary health care in
Karuzi province, Burundi. The project used a community-based assessment to provide exemption
cards for indigent households and a reduced flat fee for consultations for all other households.
Methods: An evaluation was carried out in 2005 to assess the impact of this project. Primary data
collection was through a cross-sectional household survey of the catchment areas of 10 public
health centres. A questionnaire was used to determine the accuracy of the community-
identification method, households' access to health care, and costs of care. Household
socioeconomic status was determined by reported expenditures and access to land.
Results:  Financial access to care at the nearest health centre was ensured for 70% of the
population. Of the remaining 30%, half experienced financial barriers to access and the other half
chose alternative sites of care. The community-based assessment increased the number of people
of the population who qualified for fee exemptions to 8.6% but many people who met the indigent
criteria did not receive a card. Eighty-eight percent of the population lived under the poverty
threshold. Referring to the last sickness episode, 87% of households reported having no money
available and 25% risked further impoverishment because of healthcare costs even with the financial
support system in place.
Conclusion: The flat fee policy was found to reduce cost barriers for some households but, given
the generalized poverty in the area, the fee still posed a significant financial burden. This report
showed the limits of a programme of fee exemption for indigent households and a flat fee for others
in a context of widespread poverty.
Background
Although the political situation in Burundi has now stabi-
lised, the civil conflict of 1993-2003 deeply affected the
country's inhabitants and infrastructure, particularly the
health care system. In order to help rebuild the system, a
countrywide cost recovery was implemented in 2002
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along with a national policy where the communal author-
ities were supposed to issue exemption certificates for the
poorest who could not afford health care costs [1].
Despite this plan, significant financial barriers to access
health care continued to exist. A Save the Children report
indicated that "There are serious concerns about the effec-
tiveness of this scheme in protecting the most poor from
the cost of illness and in improving their access to health
services" [2]. A Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) survey
found that almost a million persons were excluded from
health care mainly because of financial reasons and only
0.6% had an exemption certificate [3]. Despite this evi-
dence, the health authorities continued to implement the
national cost-recovery policy like many low-income coun-
tries which still rely on user fees [4].
Given this situation MSF offered to support health author-
ities in Karuzi province to develop a project to reduce
financial barriers to seeking care in government health
facilities. MSF's initial proposal of free care was not
accepted by the authorities. Consequently, the project
combined reduced fees for everyone and a community-
based identification exemption system for indigents. The
literature shows evidence that fees impact negatively on
care utilisation [5,6] and risks pushing people into pov-
erty. James sees fees as a regressive health financing mech-
anism [7]. The experience of abolishing user fees on
utilisation of health services in South Africa or in Uganda
showed positive impact [7-9].
Most documented experiences of maintaining user fees
whilst trying to mitigate their impact on the poor through
individual-targeting waiver schemes performed weakly
[10]. However isolated experiences of subsidies to the
poor reached up to 40% of the population through health
equity funds in Asia [10] and there are examples in the lit-
erature of successful experiences in Latin America [11].
Some authors therefore concluded that the weak perform-
ance of many waiver schemes stems from poor policy
design and underfunding of the projects [10,12].
In our project, MSF subsidised the cost of care through a
combination of reduced flat fee for everyone and free care
for indigents identified at community level. The exemp-
tion system for indigents incorporated previous experi-
ence and recommendations, both in terms of design and
funding, in an attempt to overcome weak performance of
such schemes in other contexts. The exemption system
therefore incorporated previous experience and recom-
mendations [12]: correct and timely financing to compen-
sate structures for lost revenue, proper information to the
beneficiaries, pre-identification (or active identification)
of households in the community, as well as having an
international NGO (MSF) playing the role of driving
agent and financier.
Objective
This article describes the impact on financial access to
health care in Karuzi province, Burundi, of a program
using (a) a reduced flat fee for any medical consultation
and (b) a community-based assessment to exempt the
poorest people from any payment, two years after imple-
mentation of the system.
Methods
Setting
Located in Northeast Burundi, Karuzi was a hilly province
[13] with 329,431 inhabitants in 2005 [14]. The popula-
tion was almost all living in a subsistence economy. There
were one referral hospital and 13 health centres (HCs), of
which three were private, and 10 were government sup-
ported, scattered across the province's seven communes.
MSF project
MSF had been active in this province since 1993. In 2003,
MSF began the community project in cooperation with
the provincial government and provincial health author-
ity (BPS) to guarantee financial access to quality health
care for Karuzi's population through the support of 10
government HCs and the hospital. MSF involvement
included provision of drugs and medical materials, rein-
forcement of HC management and community involve-
ment, supervision, training and monthly financial
incentives for the staff and financial support, as described
below. These measures were meant to improve both
financial accessibility and quality of care to the popula-
tion.
There were two financial features of the MSF plan that,
when combined, were unique when compared to other
similar projects. First, for the large majority of the popula-
tion, an all-inclusive flat fee of 300 BIF (0.28 US$ in
August 2005) per visit was applied for whatever care or
treatment was received in all public facilities. The amount
of 300 BIF was chosen in collaboration with the BPS
based on the income of a daily worker in the fields. By Jan-
uary 2003, the flat fee was implemented for the majority
of the population, besides indigents, in all the supported
facilities. Fees collected by HCs were used to cover part of
their operating costs. MSF compensated HCs for lost fee
revenue due to this program.
In the same year, communities across Karuzi elected vol-
untary members of Health Committees (Hcoms) that
were broadly representative of the province's demograph-
ics (age, gender, socio-economic status, ethnic group).
Hcoms were in charge of disseminating information
about the program to the community, ensuring correct
implementation of the tariff by the health staff and mon-
itoring problems during the project.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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The second financial feature was that the poorest house-
holds in Karuzi province were identified by a community
level assessment to receive an exemption card entitling
them to receive free health care in the supported HCs. This
exemption system took into account previous experiences
and recommendations in different health contexts, such
as making sure there was adequate financial compensa-
tion for lost (fee) revenues for the HCs, proper informa-
tion given to the public about the program, and active
identification of indigent households in the community
[12].
The exemption system was supposed to ensure that iden-
tified households (cardholders) would have access to free
health care. However, there were concerns that local
health authorities, acting alone, would select a limited
number of households because of conflicting interests.
This conflict in health service objectives between equity
and resource generation has been documented in the lit-
erature [15,16]. MSF, therefore, wanted an independent
group close to the community to decide on exemptions.
Since there was no such existing group, as has been
described in other contexts like Cambodia [17], MSF
asked the Hcoms to make the assessment, as their mem-
bers had been elected by and were known by the popula-
tion of the hills. This targeting mechanism has been
advocated in the literature on the basis that more and bet-
ter quality information is available to communities about
their members' resources, needs and circumstances [16].
Indigent household identification
The Hcoms were charged with identifying indigent house-
holds in the communities through socio-economic crite-
ria. These criteria were developed by other Non
Governmental Organizations working in the province,
together with the provincial authorities (Appendix 1) on
the basis of previous assessments [18]. Households meet-
ing at least one indigence criterion were included as ben-
eficiaries. In almost all households, cash availability was
low or non-existent so that household income could not
be used as an economic criterion as in Cambodia [17] or
Thailand [19]. We therefore used the proxy indicators of
socio-economic status and vulnerability, such as owner-
ship of land and age and sex of head of household, to cap-
ture different aspects of deprivation [16].
Hcom members received training in the community iden-
tification procedures by MSF and BPS members. Once
they had identified households meeting indigent criteria,
random verification by the BPS and MSF was used to
avoid nepotism; 10% of all identified households were
visited to check their status. The communities also partic-
ipated in the verification process: MSF and BPS intro-
duced the lists of identified households to meetings with
the population where the people could confirm or reject a
household's indigent status. Because so many people were
poor, stigma attached to receiving a card was low. On the
contrary, people hoped to get the cards and avoid finan-
cial stress.
Two full-time MSF employees were responsible for listing
the identified households, filling out the exemption cards
by hand, and organising the administrative system.
Exemption cards included information on name, age, sex
and "address" of all household members. Hcoms distrib-
uted these exemption cards to the identified households.
Lists were to be officially updated by Hcoms every two
months to add or remove households who had recently
become indigent or had improved their situation and no
longer qualified. In the end 15% of households (11,247
households) were identified as indigent in early 2005.
Design
The study included the following MSF data sources: a
cross-sectional household survey of the population living
in the catchment's area of the 10 public HCs (within 5
km) to determine the financial access to heath care (A),
and MSF reports from January 2003 to September 2005
(B).
A. Household survey
Karuzi province had 215,470 inhabitants living in the
catchment's area of the 10 HCs supported by MSF [13].
Provinces in Burundi were administratively divided into
communes, then further divided into hills and under-
hills. People did not live in villages but were scattered
amongst the hills and the distance from one house to
another could sometimes mean 30 minutes walking.
A three-stage, cluster-sampling survey was carried out
between 22 August, 2005 and 14 September, 2005. Popu-
lation data used for the sample was based on the official
registration for each commune in the province in 2000. In
the first stage of sampling, population figures were used to
determine the location of the clusters in the hills. Sur-
veyed hills were randomly selected, taking into account
the relative proportion of their population. We used a ran-
dom number generator to select hills from administration
lists. Because some hills were geographically large,
"under-hills" in the selected hills were also selected ran-
domly (second stage of sampling).
In the third stage of sampling, within each of the chosen
under-hills, the first household to be surveyed was deter-
mined by spinning a bottle in the middle of the under-hill
to choose a direction. Interviewers then walked until the
limit of the under-hill and counted the number of houses
in that direction. A table of random numbers was used to
choose the first house to visit. After obtaining consent, the
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questionnaires were successively administered to the
households located directly to the right of the front door
of the preceding house until the outer edge of the cluster
was reached. In case a household was absent or in case the
head of household was not available, teams were
instructed to revisit the house later in the day. In case they
were still absent or unavailable, the household was
replaced by the nearest household.
A household was defined as a group of people who shared
the same food and slept under the same roof for at least
three nights per week.
Measurement
The questionnaire included 27 items on the following
subjects:
- Household composition.
- Household socio-economic indicators: expenses,
access to and use of land.
- Possession of an indigent card and indigence criteria
met by the household.
- Health-seeking behaviour for the last episode of ill-
ness in the household: whether or not a consultation
had been sought, place of consultation or reason for
non-consultation and place and completeness of med-
ication received.
- Costs of care and source of the money spent for
health care costs.
This study was carried out at the same time as a mortality
survey whose recall period, based on previous experience
and literature, was three months [20]. For the question
related to the episodes of illness, the same recall period
was chosen- covering the time from the date of the com-
munal election (3 June, 2005- an important reference in
the recent history of the country) up to the date the ques-
tionnaire was administered (mean recall period = 90.7
days). Households were asked to relate the most recent
episode of illness that occurred during this period. There
were no unusual events or changes in the environment
such as epidemics or problems at the HCs such as major
drugs out of stock or strikes by the health staff during this
three-month period.
For this study, we defined having "financial access to pri-
mary health care" when a person attended the nearest
health centre for a consultation and received a full course
of medication on site. Note that in this context virtually
everyone was prescribed some medication if they
attended a HC. Medication given was then described as
full or partial based on the declaration of the respondent.
In this study, utilisation of health services at a HC near the
house of the respondents was used as a proxy indicator for
access. In this context, availability of health structures was
not an issue as the sampled households lived around HCs
supported by MSF. The choice of the sample of people liv-
ing at a maximum distance of five km from the HC was
made to be sure we would get information about other
factors influencing health seeking behaviour besides dis-
tance. It is clear however, that for the households living
further away, distance would be an additional obstacle.
For people who did not attend the nearest health centre,
reasons for their alternative choices or for staying at home
were recorded. We categorized barriers to use of health
services as financial and non-financial. Households were
considered as excluded from health care when they did
not seek any care although they felt it was necessary.
When there were no episodes of sickness in the household
during the recall period, only questions related to house-
hold composition and socio-economic situation were
asked.
We used expenses as an indicator of socioeconomic status
of the households in the analysis. They were a more stable
estimate than income in this type of rural economy, where
most people were engaged in subsistence farming, and
incomes were influenced by season, and were often irreg-
ular or under-estimated [21]. Expenses were measured on
the basis of consumption in the household the week
before the interview.
Additional information about the households' socioeco-
nomic situation was obtained by using "access to a piece
of land" to grow crops as an indicator. The households
were divided into three groups: people who did not have
access to land, people who owned or rented land for sub-
sistence farming, and people who owned or rented land
for farming for profit.
Origin of the money covering the cost of care fell into two
main categories: households that had money available
(savings, business income) for the costs of care at the time
of illness and households that had to mobilise the money.
For the latter, we considered that a household was:
- in a "precarious situation" if, in order to pay the cost
of care, it had to sell a part of its harvest, which nor-
mally fed its members, or if someone in the household
had to do extra work.
- "impoverished" if the household had to borrow
money or if land, animals or part of a future harvest
were sold to pay for the consultation.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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The questionnaire was translated into Kirundi, back trans-
lated into French and pilot-tested with 30 households in
July 2005 by the coordinator of the survey
Human resources
Considering the difficulty of carrying out a survey in such
a place, eighteen interviewers and three supervisors were
recruited. They were selected on the basis of their educa-
tion level, their knowledge of the province, their ability to
speak French and Kirundi fluently and their physical con-
dition. The team received three days of training on survey
methods and procedures. Their understanding of the pro-
cedures was evaluated through a half-day test of the ques-
tionnaire in hills not selected in the sample. The
interviewers were regularly monitored by three supervi-
sors headed by a general coordinator during the survey.
Sample size
The sample size was calculated using an estimate that 75%
of households would have access to primary health care.
If the margin of error was fixed at +/- 4% with a cluster
effect estimated at 2, then 900 households with at least
one sick person in the recall period were required. The cal-
culation used the standard formula: (1.962 × 2 × (0.75 ×
0.25/(0.04)2) = 900 [22]. Thirty clusters of 30 households
with at least one sick person were visited. However, if a
household had no sick person in the recall period,
another household was added in order to reach our
desired sample size.
Data handling
The data was entered daily by two interviewers/encoders
into Epi Info 6.04 and checked by the general coordinator
and, if necessary, with interviewers and supervisors. The
epidemiological/statistical analysis was carried out in
Brussels. Geometric means were calculated for costs and
expenses. All confidence intervals were calculated at 95%
(95%CI). Proportions were compared by the standard
chi-squared tests.
Ethics
Permissions to carry out the studies were obtained by the
BPS and the Provincial authority of Karuzi and approved
by the Ethics Review Board of MSF.
B. MSF program reports
A document review of MSF materials included the
monthly reports of the project, monthly HC data and
reports of the expatriates working on the health and man-
agement committees from January 2003 to September
2005. Those documents complemented the survey data
and were useful for describing the setting, the evolution of
the project and the resources needed for the exemption
system.
We used the documents as supporting qualitative infor-
mation about context and programme evolution. We did
not undertake a formal qualitative analysis.
Results
Description of the sample
A total of 1031 households were visited, 94 households
were absent and 937 households were interviewed, repre-
senting 4,949 persons. No household refused to be inter-
viewed. The average size of the household was 5.3 persons
(95%CI: 5.1-5.5). The age distribution of the sample was
similar to national figure for Burundi [23].
Expenses per person were, on average, 375.0 BIF (335.0-
420.7) per week.
There were 86.9% (83.8-89.9) of the households who
owned a piece of land and 6.4% (3.9-8.9) rented it to pro-
vide subsistence farming for their members. Another
1.3% (0.3-2.3) owned/rented a land for profit and 5.4%
(3.3-7.6) of households had no access to land at all.
Results of the exemption system
Characteristics of cardholders
Eighty-one households - 8.6% (6.3-11.0)- had an exemp-
tion card.
Cardholders had lower weekly expenses and fewer owned
a piece of land than non-cardholders (Table 1).
Accuracy of the community identification method
Overall, 9.2% (6.1-12.3) of households (86) were found
to have indigence criteria as defined in Appendix 1. Thirty-
three of them (38%) were landless. As table 2 shows,
44.2% of the households having at least one indigence cri-
terion were cardholders. However, more than half of
those with indigence criteria did not have a card (cover-
age) and almost half of those having a card did not fulfil
the criteria (leakage).
Access to health care
In the 937 households surveyed, 902 cases of illness were
reported (96.3%). As seen in Figure 1, 87.1% (84.5-89.8)
went for a consultation in various locations:
▪ 78.8% (73.4-84.1) sought medical help at the closest
HC (supported by MSF applying the flat fee/cards
exemption)
▪ 12.1% (6.7-17.5) went to another HC and 2.8% (0.5-
5.1) went directly to the hospital. Of these, 21.4%
(2.9-39.8) explained their choice was due to financial
barriers. Other barriers included a lack of confidence
with the HC staff or a shortage of medication at the
HC.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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▪ 6.4% (4.5-8.2) went to the informal sector/tradi-
tional healers, 58.0% (45.2-70.8) claimed to do so for
financial reasons.
Of those who consulted in the closest HC, 98.4% (97.3-
99.4) received full treatment.
In total, 70.2% (64.9-75.5) of the population had access
to care at their local HC.
However, 9.5% (7.0-12.0) of the households were
excluded from health care and for 87.8% of them (76.1-
94.5); this was due to financial barriers. Overall, 14.5%
(10.5-18.5) of households experienced financial barriers
that prevented them from accessing care at their closest
HC.
Access to health care for cardholders
Of the cardholders, 91.1% (72/79) went for a consulta-
tion for the last episode of sickness and 88.9% of these
(64/72) went to the closest HC. Of those going to the clos-
est HC, 96.9% (62/64) obtained full treatment but four of
the cardholders paid 300 BIF. Access to health care among
cardholders was higher than non-cardholders; 80.5% (CI
95%: 72.4-88.6) vs. 69.2% (CI 95%: 63.3-75.0). Although
this difference did not reach statistical significance, the
relative risk was significant; cardholders had 1.58 (0.99-
2.54) more chance to access health care than non-card-
holders.
Costs of care
Of the people who went for a consultation at the closest
HC (n = 619),
- 12.0% (8.8-15.1) did not pay for health care (74
cases) and 81.1% (71.8-98.3) had a card (60 cases).
For those who paid,
- The average amount paid was 311.2 BIF (304.8-
317.7) or median amount of 300 BIF.
- 6.3% (1.8-15.7) of the cardholders (4 cases) still paid
the flat fee,
- 2.5% (1.2-3.8) of non-cardholders (14 cases) did not
pay for health care.
Origin of the money and effects of the cost of care on households
Of the cases who went for a consultation at the closest HC,
Table 3 shows that only 13.1% of the households had the
money available at the moment of the disease.
Of the rest, 61.0% entered into a precarious situation
because they had to look for extra work outside of the
household (123 cases) or they had to sell a part of their
harvest that they would normally have used for their own
food (209 cases) and 25.9% of the households became
impoverished. Most of them went into debt (116 cases),
some had to sell part of their future harvest (20 cases) and
a few sold animals or land (5 cases).
Discussion
This study showed that despite an innovative program
that combined a flat fee for care for most people with an
exemption system for indigents, there continued to be sig-
nificant financial barriers in accessing health care in
Table 1: Comparison between non-cardholders and cardholders
Households without cards
(n = 855*)
Households with cards
(n = 81)
Amount (BIF) CI 95% Amount (BIF) CI 95%
Expenses/pers./week 397.2 352.4-446.7 208 133.7-324.3
n % CI 95% n % CI 95%
Own/rent land for profit 11 1.3% 0.3-2.2 1 1.2% 0.0-3.6
Own land for survival 760 88.90% 85.8-92.0 53 65.40% 53.4-77.5
Rent land for survival 56 6.60% 3.9-9.2 4 4.90% 0.5-9.4
Without land 28 3.30% 1.3-5.3 23 28.40% 16.7-40.1
* 1 missing
Table 2: Distribution of cardholders/positive indigence criteria
Households with card Households without card
n % CI 95% n % CI 95%
With indigence criteria 38 44.20% 26.4-62.0 48 55.80% 38.0-73.6
Without indigence criteria 43 5.10% 3.7-6.4 808 95.00% 93.6-96.3International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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Karuzi. Even though access to health care was readily
available for 70% of overall population, about 30%
sought care elsewhere or stayed home. Why was this so?
1. Significant overall poverty
A key feature was that the national poverty line in rural
areas was evaluated at 1031.73 BIF/person/week [24], so
that 88.0% (83.5-91.6) of the population in Karuzi lived
below that threshold at the time of the survey, confirming
a context of widespread generalized poverty. Cash availa-
ble at the household level was limited and it was difficult
to mobilise quickly in the face of unexpected expenses for
an episode of illness.
Although most households in the province owned a piece
of land, it was just enough for subsistence, not for profit.
Assessments carried out at the national level revealed that
the average size of land per household was less than 0.5
ha [25], barely enough to feed household members, let
alone generate income. The situation became worse dur-
ing the crisis that affected the country during the past dec-
ade when many households had to sell their land [25].
"Landless" was the main indigence criterion reported in
the survey.
Access to primary health care Figure 1
Access to primary health care.
Table 3: Situation of households that paid for health care
n = 544* % CI 95%
Money available 71 13.10% 9.0-17.1
Precarious 332 61.00% 54.3-67.8
Impoverished 141 25.90% 20.3-31.6
* 1 missingInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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2. The exemption system: mixed results
The exemption system was found to protect only 8.6%
(6.3-11.0) of the population. This was lower than the
15% of households identified by the Hcoms but larger
than in other provinces in Burundi [3] or in other coun-
tries where classical exemption mechanisms were in place
[26-28]. Exemption schemes, even those endorsed by pol-
icy and legislation, are rarely fully effective. Schemes
aimed at targeting the poor with exemptions often miss
the intended beneficiaries, those in greatest need [29].
MSF studies have shown that classical exemption mecha-
nisms in Mali, Sierra Leone or Haiti covered less than 2%
of the population" [30]. And Ridde [31] noticed that,
although exemption of payment for indigents was one of
the core principles of the Bamako Initiative, in many set-
tings, exemptions had not been implemented or had not
been able to protect very many people in the community.
However, results similar to those of our study were found
with equity funds in Cambodia [29,32]. Their design was
close to the exemption system developed in Karuzi and
included the existence of donor funding, the presence of a
driving agent, clear separation of roles, and appropriate
identification techniques. These studies reached conclu-
sions similar to ours: while these mechanisms are superior
to traditional waiver systems in terms of health services
utilisation by the target group, studies reveal remaining
barriers to access and indebtedness prevention.
However, existing studies tend to focus on hospital and
health structure data while failing to provide information
on non-users of the system. Our study therefore brings
additional data on general population access. These data
are crucial to be considered for national policy choices.
Our results showed that cardholders had better financial
access to health care than non-cardholders. It was also
encouraging that almost all cardholders benefited from
free health care in public HCs.
Although most of the cardholders were in a worse socio-
economic situation than the rest of the population, the
exemption system had problems properly covering the
poor as shown by 56% of the households who had at least
one indigent criterion but did not get cards. One reason
for this low coverage could be the time lag between the
date of identification and the survey. This would reinforce
the idea that exemption systems do not capture properly
the dynamic dimension of poverty. At the same time, 5%
of households did get cards despite not having met the cri-
teria. As well, although Hcoms had identified 15% of
households as indigent, our survey found only 8.6% of
households in possession of a card. This difference could
be explained by the following:
▪ Around 400 cards (3.5% of all the cards distributed)
were never distributed to the identified households
because the householders were absent during the dis-
tribution meetings and the Hcoms did not follow up.
▪ Initially, some health staff members were reluctant to
accept the exemption system and confiscated cards
when they considered that beneficiaries did not qual-
ify as indigent. This situation improved with time
thanks to the reporting of the Hcoms.
▪ Cards lost were often not renewed by the Hcoms.
These difficulties should have been handled by the Hcoms
with updates to the list every two months. However, this
would have implied constant and time-consuming re-
assessment. Experience in this project showed that main-
taining an accurate list was a complicated and imperfect
process, very demanding both financially and in terms of
human resources. Members of Hcoms were not paid and
this may have affected their motivation.
Furthermore, the performance of the system was ham-
pered by the difficulty in defining and interpreting indi-
gence criteria in a context of generalised poverty. The
feasibility and accuracy of distinguishing the poor from
the non-poor to determine eligibility for exemptions, is
fraught with problems [28,33]. The notion of indigence is
complex and covers both poverty and social exclusion
[34]. Criteria might have been subjectively and arbitrarily
interpreted even though the members of the health com-
mittees had been trained to recognise eligible households.
"A major difficulty is to identify very poor people in a
population in which the poverty is rife" [33].
The exemption system was demanding in terms of other
human and financial resources. In addition to the Hcom
members' time, human resource inputs included signifi-
cant time of two full-time staff members, financed by
MSF. Significant financial costs arose from MSF's financial
support to HCs for compensation of revenue lost due to
exemptions, considered a key condition for fee exemption
schemes to be pro-poor [12]. This raises the question of
whether such resources should be provided to a system
which benefits a relatively small number of people, partic-
ularly in a context of poverty. Other authors argued that
"A universal free healthcare approach is justified in all sit-
uations with widespread misery or when time does not
allow individual assessment schemes to be implemented
[...]. Alternatively, identifying people living in poverty (by
proxy means testing) and targeting benefits to them could
be more attractive than a universal approach if the propor-
tion of poor people in the society is not overwhelming..."
[10]International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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3. Access to health care
Despite these difficulties there were some positive ele-
ments to the project. In 2003, for all of Burundi, the level
of access to health care in areas where cost-recovery was
implemented was 58% of the population [3]. In the
Karuzi project, access to health care was much better, as
70% of the population went for a consultation to the clos-
est HC and received full medication. Other encouraging
results were that consultations in the informal sector were
few (6.4%) as compared to other African contexts [30].
Although mechanisms set up in the project to improve
access proved to have done so compared to other areas in
Burundi where cost recovery schemes were implemented,
they still revealed important limitations in their potential
to increase the use of health services for the population.
Almost 15% still had financial barriers to access the clos-
est HC and 10% of the population remained excluded
from health care mainly for financial reasons. These find-
ings were in line with other surveys revealing that even
low fees constituted an obstacle to patients' access in con-
texts of widespread poverty [30,35]. MSF's experience has
also revealed that targeting strategies compared poorly to
general exemption or those based on large categories (like
women and children), such as those implemented in
Burundi in 2006 (national free care policy for under-5s
and pregnant women). In addition, in contexts where
health fees were totally abolished for all patients, evidence
has shown an increase in the use of health services and
specific benefits for the poorest households [35].
4. Cost of care, financial burden in households
A specific feature of the project was the implementation of
the reduced flat fee system. Although the amount of the
agreed fee seemed minimal and was respected by the staff,
one visit to the primary health care level represented
almost the equivalent of one day of household expenses.
Eighty-seven percent of households reported not having
sufficient money available to seek immediate care for
their last illness episode. To finance health care, more
than a quarter became impoverished and 60% needed
extra work to provide cash flow, which risked delaying
consultation. Thus, despite the reduced flat fee, the cost of
health care still represented an important burden for
many households. Further, our study did not include indi-
rect costs linked to treatment such as transportation, food
expenditure and loss of time [35]. These costs can initiate
a vicious circle underlined by Noirhomme et al. [32] in
which "poverty not only brings ill-health, but ill-health
also tends to worsen poverty".
Limitations
There were a number of limitations to the study. MSF was
well known in the province especially for the identifica-
tion of indigents. Although the surveyors - MSF employ-
ees - clarified that they were not in charge of identifying
indigents in the community, respondents might have
answered questions in a way to maximise their benefit, for
instance, by overestimating their expenses in hope of
being included on the indigent lists. This factor is likely to
have been limited given the very low level of expenses
reported. If present, this bias would lead to an underesti-
mation of real poverty levels rather than an overestima-
tion, as expenses were used to assess the socio economic
status of households. As well, confronted by a western
medical organisation, the respondents might have under-
reported the use of traditional medicines or of the infor-
mal sector.
An additional concern may be the 90.7-day recall period
for last illness episode, which may have reduced the accu-
racy of details recalled. However, potential recall bias was
reduced since the illness of inquiry was the most recent
during the recall period.
Conclusion
An innovative approach of adopting a flat fee for consul-
tations in primary care clinics in rural Burundi and identi-
fying indigents was somewhat successful in increasing
financial access to care. However, against a background of
widespread poverty, and the difficulties to properly target
the poor in such a context, many people still did not
obtain appropriate care or suffered financial hardship
doing so. Introducing these measures was cumbersome,
and not really responsive to the poverty dynamics in the
population. These results indicate that alternative strate-
gies, such as free care for everyone or targeted groups such
as under-5s or pregnant women as implemented in
Burundi in 2006, are needed to ensure increased access to
effective health services for the poor.
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Appendix 1 - Exemption criteria
Groups identified by Hcom
° Long-term welfare recipient: Socially isolated, without
children, often elderly without family. No income or sav-
ings; inadequate food, clothes and accommodation. Lives
with the support of the neighbourhood. Often disabled
and/or with serious health problems.International Journal for Equity in Health 2009, 8:36 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/8/1/36
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° Without land/property: live in hut, seasonal workers.
° Disabled people in household with no member capable
of working, not receiving assistance from outside the
household.
° Elderly (over 55 years old) in household with no mem-
ber capable of working, not receiving assistance from out-
side the household.
° Orphans head of household (below 18 years old) not
receiving assistance from outside the household.
° Foster care and orphans care, taking care of indigents, in
household with no member capable of working, not
receiving assistance from outside the household.
° Widowed, head of household, in a household with no
member capable of working; low income; not receiving
assistance from outside the household.
Groups identified by HCR, directors of school
° Repatriated households, 6 months after their return.
° Students meeting above criteria.
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